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One central goal of systems neuroscience is to understand how neural circuits implement the computations
that link sensory inputs to behavior. Work combining electrophysiological and imaging-based approaches to
measure neural activity with pharmacological and electrophysiological manipulations has provided funda-
mental insights. More recently, genetic approaches have been used to monitor and manipulate neural
activity, opening up new experimental opportunities and challenges. Here, we discuss issues associated
with applying genetic approaches to circuit dissection in sensorimotor transformations, outlining important
considerations for experimental design and considering how modeling can complement experimental
approaches.Introduction
A primary goal of neuroscience is to understand how the brain
computes. Over more than 100 years, detailed studies of sen-
sory systems and motor outputs have related neural activity to
stimuli and responses and provided a rich, quantitative frame-
work for understanding a fundamental neural computation, the
transformation of sensory input into behavioral output. However,
establishing causal links between sensory inputs, circuit activity,
and behavioral outputs has proven challenging. The recent
development of tools for manipulating and monitoring neural
activity in genetic model organisms (reviewed in Fenno et al.,
2011; Luo et al., 2008; Venken et al., 2011) has enabled a
marriage of genetics and systems neuroscience. These tools
can define types of neurons, establishing neuronal identity inde-
pendent of activity pattern or morphology. In addition, a wealth
of genetic effectors allows neural activity to be measured and
manipulated in cell type-specific ways. These tools reveal corre-
lations between neural activity and behavior and, more impor-
tantly, help establish causal relationships between neurons,
circuits, and behaviors. Finally, model organisms have relatively
compact brains, with reasonably stereotyped complements of
cell types and connections. Together, these advantages promise
high-resolution dissection of neural circuit function. In this
Perspective, we highlight central questions to consider when
measuring, modulating, and modeling neural activity in sen-
sorimotor circuits.
In its basic form, neural circuit dissection seeks to establish
specific relationships between a Stimulus X, Behavior Y, and
activity in Neuron Z. One simple (and likely unrealistic) hypo-
thesis is that each of these entities is one-dimensional, such
that stimulus X either activates or inhibits neuron Z and promotes
or inhibits behavior Y. With this assumption, the predicted
effects of genetically manipulating the activity of neuron Z are
limited to promoting or inhibiting a behavior, and neuron Z’sfunction is described as ‘‘necessary’’ or ‘‘sufficient,’’ terms taken
from the lexicon of genetics. With this approach, it is possible to
define some basic circuit components by ‘‘breaking’’ the circuit
and monitoring the behavioral outcome. It is critical to keep in
mind that necessity and sufficiency are not themselves descrip-
tions of how the circuit computes, but they are useful constraints
on circuit models. These constraints have three components.
First, one can construct a catalog of stimuli affecting, and
behaviors affected by, the activity of specific types of neurons
and thus identify the relevant populations of neurons within
circuits. Second, if the behavior being examined exhibits an
increase or decrease in magnitude, it is possible to determine
whether the neuron promotes or inhibits the behavior. Finally,
by simultaneously manipulating neurons at multiple stages in a
circuit, it is possible to perform a circuit equivalent of genetic
epistasis to order different neuron types into hierarchical
pathways within a network. Ongoing efforts in many systems
are establishing such pathway constraints and have greatly
increased our basic understanding of neuronal circuitry.
However, the core weakness of this approach is that sensory
inputs and behavioral outputs are multidimensional and any
neural manipulation or stimulus modification probably affects
behavior differently along different dimensions. Furthermore, it
is unlikely that the function of any neuron is to simply modulate
the strength of the coupling between a stimulus and a response.
Thus, the conclusions drawn from ‘‘circuit breaking’’ experi-
ments are shaped, and potentially biased, not only by the struc-
ture and function of the neural circuits involved, but also by the
stimuli used and how neural activity and behavior are measured
and represented. Accordingly, it is critical to incorporate the
breadth of potential stimuli and behavioral responses into
experiments that use genetic tools to manipulate neural activity.
These experiments can be more difficult, but this deeper under-
standing will capture how the elaborate architecture of the brainNeuron 78, May 22, 2013 ª2013 Elsevier Inc. 583
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dynamic character of behavior and its modulation by the sensory
experience. Overall, it is critical to understand how one’s a priori
assumptions regarding the dimensionality of the variables within
a circuit influences experimental design and interpretation of
genetic circuit breaking experiments. While many of the consid-
erations discussed herein would hold true for examining circuitry
in general, wewill use sensorimotor circuits as a platform to high-
light points to consider when using genetic model systems to
dissect neuronal circuits.
How Are the Bounds of a Circuit Defined?
At the outset, the experimenter should aim to define an opera-
tional bound on the circuit components of interest. In sensori-
motor behaviors, such a circuit clearly includes the connected
set of neurons that start with sensation and end with the motor
output. However, this is an overly simplified description, since
these circuits are often influenced both by additional sensory
modalities and by top-down inputs from other brain regions.
Thus, we should consider two types of inputs into sensorimotor
circuits: proximal inputs from the environment and modulatory
(or gating) inputs from other brain regions that represent the
animal’s goals and state. To limit complexity when exploring
circuit function, one could consider only those neurons whose
activities change on timescales comparable to the stimuli and
behaviors under investigation. For example, the analysis could
be restricted to circuit components that are directly involved in
the immediate sensorimotor transformation. Alternatively, one
could assess the circuit components that modulate the transfor-
mation on fast timescales, effectively changing the computation
of the network, thereby including sensory cues that act only
indirectly onmotor outputs (e.g., pheromones that affect arousal)
and phenomena like selective attention, which can rapidly
reshape a sensorimotor transformation. Thus, selecting circuitry
based on timescale would separate circuit components that
control a fast sensorimotor transformation from those that
control, for instance, a circadian rhythm that modulates it.
From a practical standpoint, then, a core goal is to hold the
activities of these slowly varying circuit elements stationary
across each experiment.
Within this broad bound, it is often possible and useful to
identify subcircuit modules that perform particular steps in a
sensorimotor transformation. For example, one module might
be involved in identifying an odor, while another is involved in
generating the appropriate behavioral response. Modules may
be arranged sequentially so that the output of one acts as an
input to a downstream module. Alternatively, they may be
arranged in parallel, enabling both divergent and convergent
processing. Analogously, computations can be segmented into
discrete elements or ‘‘building blocks’’ that can be used in
multiple, distinct sensorimotor circuits, so that studying com-
putational modules in one context can provide insight into similar
operations in other circuits.
How Are Sensory Inputs Defined?
To dissect sensorimotor circuit function, one must establish the
realm of sensory inputs. For any sensory system, the physical
properties of the detector define the limits of sensory inputs.584 Neuron 78, May 22, 2013 ª2013 Elsevier Inc.For example, individual photoreceptors are tuned to particular
wavelength ranges, have limited dynamic range, exhibit spatial
and temporal filtering, and undergo significant adaptation
(Arshavsky and Burns, 2012; Baylor and Fuortes, 1970; Baylor
and Hodgkin, 1974; Baylor et al., 1974; Stavenga, 2002; Wald,
1949). As information that is not captured by peripheral sensors
cannot be recovered by downstream circuit operations, how the
sensor reshapes and represents the input signal strictly limits
what the brain knows about the world.
Sensory inputs are typically high dimensional. In the case of
vision, for example, a full description of the stimulus would
include the spectral composition and photon count across all
of visual space as a function of time. However, natural stimuli
are highly structured, with many particular combinations of
stimulus features being overrepresented. For instance, for
most animals, many visual objects are large enough that they
are simultaneously detected by more than one photoreceptor.
Similarly, individual odorant concentrations can be correlated
or anticorrelated with each other, creating odor combinations
that represent specific environments or objects. An animal may
also influence the statistics of its environment, either by
inhabiting a certain environment or by moving in a way that
creates particular spatial or temporal sampling patterns. For
example, by generating a particular velocity distribution, motor
outputs can shape the pattern of visual inputs (Egelhaaf et al.,
2012; Kern et al., 2001; O’Carroll et al., 1996). Similarly, in
rodents, breathing alters the temporal pattern of olfactory
cues, while the pattern of whisker movements shapes somato-
sensation (Carvell and Simons, 1990; Smear et al., 2011). Finally,
in social behaviors, sensory cues are provided in a temporal
pattern that depends on the movements and actions of multiple
animals, as well as on their interactions, further increasing
stimulus dimensionality. Fortunately, many social behaviors,
including mating or aggression, can also display significant
stereotypy (Hall, 1994; Liu and Sternberg, 1995; Stone, 1922),
creating a measure of predictability that the brain can exploit.
In this context, one can think of the processing in downstream
sensory circuits as extracting relevant low-dimensional features,
suchas visualmotionor odor identity, fromvery high-dimensional
input spaces. Naturally occurring or behaviorally induced
correlations in the inputs can then be exploited by the circuit to
extract sensory information efficiently. This can be done in a
‘‘lossy’’ manner, in which features of interest are captured and
other information is discarded (Barlow, 1953; Lettvin et al.,
1959). Alternately, it can be done in a ‘‘lossless’’ manner, in which
redundancy in the signal is removed and some features are high-
lighted without losing the ability to reconstruct the original signal
(Atick, 2011; Barlow, 1961; Field, 1994; Hateren, 1992; Olshau-
sen and Field, 1996). Ultimately, behavioral responses are intrin-
sically lossy computations, as they reduce the sensory stimulus
to a single, selected response. As a result, it seems unlikely that
any sensory system implements truly lossless encoding. Rather,
in every sensory system, selective filtering probably begins very
early on in the processing stream.
How Can Sensory Stimuli Be Chosen Experimentally?
Given the breadth of the sensory environment, it is rare that
any experiment could probe all possible inputs. As a result,
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Figure 1. Probing a System with Different Stimuli
(A) Examples of pulse and step changes in stimuli (top) and simulated
responses (bottom).
(B) A Gaussian stimulus. The left plot shows the distribution of Gaussian
stimulus values (with mean 1), while the right plots show a Gaussian noise
stimulus (top) and a simulated sample response (bottom).
(C) Schematic of the LN model. In the model, stimuli (left trace) are first
passed over with a linear filter to produce a weighted average of the stimulus
(middle trace). That filtered stimulus is mapped onto the response (right trace)
with a function that may contain nonlinearities. The filter can be estimated from
the system response to a Gaussian noise input, after which the mapping
function can be fit to the data. The function is linear in the case of the
linear system, or can account for postfiltering nonlinearities that occur quickly
compared to the filtering process, for instance to prevent very strong
responses (create saturation) or to prevent negative responses (create
rectification).
(D) A naturalistic stimulus (from van Hateren, 1997). In the distribution on the
left, note the infrequent but large stimulus values (the mean is set to 1). A time
series of that distribution, incorporating naturalistic dynamics (top), along with
a simulated sample response to that stimulus (bottom) is shown.
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Perspectivedetermining the subset of inputs to explore represents a critical
experimental decision. One’s intuition about biology, particularly
the ethological context of the behavior, obviously plays an
important role in the choice of a stimulus. Indeed, in the case
of social behaviors, the choice of an appropriate stimulus is
probably significantly constrained by the context necessary to
evoke the behavior at all. However, for many sensorimotor
circuits, other strategies for selecting stimuli are also worth
considering. A long tradition in neuroscience has involved the
use of relatively simple stimuli that represent some fundamental
aspect of a sensory cue. For example, to examine visual motion
detection, square-wave gratings that comprise alternating
contrast stripes have long been used to elicit motion responses
(Andermann et al., 2011; Brockerhoff et al., 1995; Campbell
et al., 1969; Go¨tz, 1964; Go¨tz and Wenking, 1973; Hecht and
Wald, 1934; Marshel et al., 2011; Niell and Stryker, 2008; Orger
et al., 2000; Prusky et al., 2000). These have provided powerful
insights, identifying motion-sensitive neurons and circuits in
flies, fish, and mice and building upon previous work describing
direction-selective neurons in other model animals (Barlow and
Hill, 1963; Kozak et al., 1965; Maunsell and Van Essen, 1983).
Yet, even these simple stimuli are complex in their neural pro-
cessing. For example, when square-wave gratings were used
to distinguish the functions of two early visual processing path-
ways in Drosophila, few differences were seen (Rister et al.,
2007). It was only when even simpler stimuli, consisting of single
light or dark edges, were used that stark functional differences
between the pathways were observed (Clark et al., 2011; Joesch
et al., 2010). Simplicity is thus in the eye of the beholder—or
rather in the response of the circuitry.
In guiding the selection of simple stimuli, there is often an infor-
mative minimum set of inputs required for a given computation.
For example, to perceive motion requires at least two spatially
separated sensors that are stimulated by changes in light inten-
sity at two points in time (Poggio and Reichardt, 1973). More
broadly, limiting the extent of stimulus presentation (whether in
duration, space, or any other stimulus parameter) allows one to
describe the minimal amount of sensory information needed to
evoke the behavior of interest. This approach affords two impor-
tant advantages. First, limiting the stimulus presentation reduces
the exposure of these circuits to the cues that drive adaptation,
allowing better control of adaptation state across an experiment.
Second, when a circuit’s response is barely evoked, it is sensi-
tized to modulation, making it more likely that targeted genetic
manipulations of small groups of neurons will produce changes
in the response.
Without knowing what the minimal input might be, the princi-
pled approach of linear systems analysis postulates a specific
input-output structure that can be measured experimentally.
Within a linear system, one can relate any number of dynamically
changing stimulus characteristics to behavioral or neural re-
sponses using particular types of inputs (see Figure 1). The
simple definition of a linear system is that its response to a
weighted sum of inputs equals the weighted sum of the re-
sponses to each input individually. Importantly, it is often
possible to determine whether a system is linear by testing
whether this input-output relationship holds. Furthermore, even
highly nonlinear systems generally respond linearly to smallvariations in stimulus strength (Marmarelis, 2004) (with some
notable exceptions; Eguı´luz et al., 2000). As a result, brief or
low-amplitude stimulus presentations can provide regimes in
which this analysis is applicable to many complex circuits. For
example, the temporal response properties of visual neurons
to contrast can be described using stimuli that vary in intensity,
increasing or decreasing in brightness either stably (forming a
‘‘step’’) or transiently (making an ‘‘impulse’’) or from continuouslyNeuron 78, May 22, 2013 ª2013 Elsevier Inc. 585
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Perspectivevarying noise (Figures 1A and 1B) (Baylor et al., 1974; McCann,
1974). From these stimuli, one can derive mathematical func-
tions, or filters, to describe the system’s response as a weighted
average of its previous inputs. For any temporal pattern of input
signals within the linear range, this filter can be used to describe
the dynamics of the system’s output. Often, a static nonlinearity
is applied to the output of the linear filter in order to account for
saturation or rectification effects, forming what is called a linear
nonlinear (LN) model (Figure 1C) (Baccus and Meister, 2002;
Chichilnisky, 2001; Sakai et al., 1988). Linear filters can predict
responses to any input as long as the model assumptions hold
and can describe neural responses recorded using either elec-
trophysiological approaches (Baccus and Meister, 2002; Kim
and Rieke, 2001) or calcium imaging (Clark et al., 2011; Ramdya
et al., 2006), as well as behavioral responses (Aptekar et al.,
2012; Clark et al., 2011; Rohrseitz and Fry, 2011; Theobald
et al., 2010). However, in some cases, these methods produce
poor fits to observed responses, indicating that the underlying
assumptions are violated. A single LN system, for instance,
may not capture the behavior of a circuit across a wide range
of inputs (see, for instance, Daly and Normann, 1985). Similarly,
this model cannot be used when the gain of a system is itself a
function of its inputs (Olsen et al., 2010). In addition, adapting
systems often require multiple fits to the LN model (Baccus
and Meister, 2002). In sum, these approaches can capture a
system’s properties under some regimes but tend to under-
estimate the extent of the nonlinear operations that circuits
perform, many of which may be crucial to how the circuit func-
tions in the presence of natural stimuli.
Approaches that focus on using the simplest of stimuli neglect
the complexity of the sensory environment that neural systems
have evolved to process. Natural stimuli are often not near
perceptual thresholds, can contain large variations in stimulus
amplitude, and are highly structured (Figure 1D) (Ruderman
and Bialek, 1994; van Hateren, 1997). In addition, natural stimuli
often stimulate multiple sensory systems, requiring the brain to
integrate information across modes. Such naturalistic stimuli
can be used to probe sensory systems in more challenging
regimes, but when the evoked responses are not predicted by
impulse or step responses, or by a model, it becomes difficult
to tease out which aspects of the ethologically relevant stimulus
resulted in the observed behavior (Boeddeker et al., 2005; David
et al., 2004; Rajan and Bialek, 2012). Yet, the functional charac-
teristics of a circuit that defy extrapolation from simple to natural
stimuli are perhaps the most interesting and may constitute
mechanisms that enhance or suppress specific aspects of sen-
sory information. Thus, comparing responses to simple, artificial
stimuli to those evoked by natural stimuli would point toward
what information the system is built to extract. In truth, although
the requirement to compare natural and simple artificial stimuli
responses is widely recognized in the field, direct comparisons
are rare because it is not trivial to parse a natural stimulus into
simpler stimuli that optimally stimulate a circuit. Consider
vision for instance: should we probe circuits with lines (Hubel
and Wiesel, 1962), edges (Schiller et al., 1976), Gabor filters
(Daugman, 1985), random dot patterns (Baker et al., 1981),
textural correlations (Jule´sz et al., 1978), or rather attempt to
extract those natural features most relevant to the system (Rajan586 Neuron 78, May 22, 2013 ª2013 Elsevier Inc.and Bialek, 2012)? Each of these approaches has value, and the
answer on how to proceed will not be universal but rather circuit
dependent. It is important to note that some natural sensory cues
are so specific that no reasonable decomposition is possible. For
example, pheromonal cues that guide social behaviors can be
exquisitely unique to the organism and presented only under
specific circumstances (Bray and Amrein, 2003; Kimchi et al.,
2007). Nonetheless, during many social interactions, multiple
sensory cues are presented in conjunction and can play a role
inmodulating the behavior. In this context, reducing the complex
mixture of cues to individual components can reveal how
specific behavioral components are linked to single natural
sensory cues.
While there is only one way for a system to respond linearly,
there are an infinite number of ways for a system to be nonlinear.
One approach to characterizing a nonlinear system, then, is to
simply ‘‘guess and test’’ by hypothesizing what forms of nonlin-
earities likely characterize it. For example, a response shaped by
inhibition as well as excitation may linearly depend on its inputs if
they are simply added together but be nonlinear if they are multi-
plied or divided (Olsen et al., 2010; Silver, 2010). Provided with a
set of hypotheses, one could then probe the circuit with inputs
that would distinguish between them and additional stimuli can
then be designed to fit the parameters of the model. While
analytical methods for dissecting nonlinearities are not as canon-
ized as linear systems analysis, a number of important methods
(for example, Volterra series expansions, bispectral analysis, and
nonlinear dynamic systems analysis) have been applied to neural
and behavioral signals in a variety of experimental settings to
reveal how different stimuli give rise to different circuit outputs
(Bullock et al., 1997; Marmarelis, 2004; Poggio and Reichardt,
1980; Sigl and Chamoun, 1994; Stephens et al., 2008). Further
development and application of approaches to nonlinear
systems analysis are likely to be critical to studies of behavioral
responses elicited by complex, ethologically relevant stimuli.
In order to probe neural circuits with naturalistic stimuli, it is
also useful to consider how ethological multisensory inputs
might shape circuit computation. Three questions emerge. First,
to what extent are the interactions between different sensory
inputs tightly tuned for particular stimuli? At one extreme, very
specific combinations of sensory inputs may be needed to elicit
a unique behavioral response, as in the case of male aggression
inmice (Stowers et al., 2002). Alternatively, the presence of a cue
from one sensory modality could simply alter the gain of the
response to other cues, as is seen with the presence of an attrac-
tive odor in a visually guided odor localization strategy (Duister-
mars and Frye, 2008; Frye et al., 2003). Second, at what level in
the processing pathway does integration occur? For example,
the null hypothesis for multisensory integration would be that
different types of sensory inputs are processed independently,
and then combined only in motor centers, during the shaping
of the behavioral response. Alternatively, integration could occur
early in sensory processing pathways, reshaping the perception
of one sensory input as a function of the characteristics of
another (Cohen et al., 2011). Finally, what operation does the
brain perform to integrate the cues in question? For example, if
integration occurs at the level of behavior, it can be a simple
summation of the individual behavioral responses to each cue
Neuron
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one cue can be gated by the characteristics of the other, such
that the presence of one stimulus determines how the animal
responds to the second input (Chow et al., 2011). The first of
these modes of cue integration could be treated as linear,
while the second clearly reflects nonlinear combination and
exemplifies how naturalistic stimuli affect the choice of ex-
perimental and analytical strategies.
How Are Behavioral Outputs Defined?
Since behavior is the ultimate output of a circuit, it provides a
powerful tool to assess the contribution of individual neurons
to circuit function. At one level, the simple fact that a sensory
stimulus canmodulate behavior provides evidence that the stim-
ulus is ‘‘informative.’’ However, unlike neural activity, in which
changes in membrane potential or intracellular calcium levels
are broadly held to be meaningful measures, no such common
currency exists for behavior. That is, while any behavioral change
that can be reliably evoked is operationally useful, how that
change is measured and defined shapes the inferences one
draws about circuit computation. For example, while an animal’s
movement can always be described as some set of accelera-
tions and velocities over time, the sensorimotor circuit may, or
may not, actually compute these values. Moreover, while one
should always strive to describe circuit output with the highest
resolution (so that as much data as possible are available about
behavior), practical considerations intrude and important
choices about the resolution of the analysis must be made.
Therefore, it is critical to be mindful of the conceptual issues
regarding how these choices influence the conclusions about
circuit function. Here we review some considerations that feed
into behavioral measurements and representations.
By definition, the full sensorimotor transformation imple-
mented by a circuit can only be captured by measuring the
output of every motor neuron (or its muscle target). If each indi-
vidual muscle fiber were considered an independent element,
the output space of behavior would be enormous. Fortunately,
there are significant correlations in the activation patterns of in-
dividual muscle fibers within a particular limb joint, across joints
within a limb, and between limbs, which reduce behavioral
complexity at the level of the components into a unified simple
behavior of an entire limb or body. In addition, looking at fine-
scale behavioral output may not be useful if the stimulus shapes
behavior at a higher level, corresponding to some larger pattern
of movement. For example, many behavioral outputs are trig-
gered by command neurons that are activated by sensory in-
puts, and correlations in the output emerge through the actions
of central pattern generators (CPGs). CPGs, in turn, may be
modulated by other somatosensory stimuli (Grillner and Jessell,
2009; Marder and Calabrese, 1996). Thus, for behaviors driven
by CPGs, descriptions at the level of individual muscles, joints,
and limbs may be unnecessary for capturing behavioral output,
and the appropriate description could be at the level of gesture
or body movement. CPGs further allow the mapping of many
sensory inputs onto a larger-scale single motor output (e.g.,
turning), or the mapping of one sensory input onto one of several
outputs depending on context (visually guided navigation while
walking or flying, for instance).Since sensory inputs can influence high-level behavioral com-
mands or low-level, fine-scale patterns of motor activity, defining
how the stimulus influences behavior is a critical, early goal.
Accordingly, different methods of analysis have been explored
to represent behavior at different degrees of granularity with
the underlying assumption that the parameters in the represen-
tation are also modulated by the stimulus. With a coarse-grained
representation, one could examine how the integrated behavior
arising from many sensorimotor transformations changes the
spatial distribution of a population of animals over some com-
paratively long period of time (Figures 2A and 2B). Such accumu-
lation assays have a long history, forming the basis for the
characterization of a variety of ‘‘taxis’’ behaviors, including
chemotaxis (Fishilevich et al., 2005; Ward, 1973), phototaxis
(Benzer, 1967), and thermotaxis (Hedgecock and Russell,
1975; Rosenzweig et al., 2005), among many others. At the
next level of granularity, one could measure the displacement
and orientation of animals over time and look for the behavioral
mechanisms that modulate the distribution of these metrics
(Figure 2C) (Burgess et al., 2010; Katsov and Clandinin, 2008;
Tammero and Dickinson, 2002). This type of description shares
intellectual roots with studies of bacterial chemotaxis (Berg
and Brown, 1972; Block et al., 1982) and looks for directed
biases in turning or translational movements that would define
locomotory decision algorithms (Goetz, 1968; Pierce-Shimo-
mura et al., 1999; Ryu and Samuel, 2002). The discrete form of
this analysis has a long history in neuroethology (Tinbergen,
1977), describing behavior as a sequence of defined events
(e.g., ‘‘turns,’’ ‘‘stops,’’ ‘‘wing extension,’’ ‘‘tapping,’’ etc.) and
creating a so-called ethogram. Identification of these events
can then be performed either by visual inspection (for instance,
Van Abeelen, 1964) or by an automated algorithm (Branson
et al., 2009; Braun et al., 2010; Geurten et al., 2010). This type
of categorization also leads naturally to time series analyses
that examine the statistical relationships between events of inter-
est, and how these might be modified by a stimulus or a circuit
(Branson et al., 2009; Nilsen et al., 2004). These analyses can
reveal tightly coupled sequences of behavioral events, such as
those associated with highly stereotyped mating behaviors
(Hall, 1994; Liu and Sternberg, 1995), or more weakly probabi-
listic sequences that underpin locomotion (Branson et al.,
2009; Pierce-Shimomura et al., 1999). Finally, at the next level
of resolution, one could measure how the movements of individ-
ual body parts (legs, fins, or heads) are changed by the stimulus
to produce movement (Boyden and Raymond, 2003; Brockerh-
off et al., 1995; Stephens et al., 2008; Strauss and Heisenberg,
1990; Zanker and Gotz, 1990). This level of description leads
naturally to the investigation of how specific motor circuits
produce these movement patterns. Finally, with a fine-grained
representation, one could measure the activation patterns
of individual muscles or muscle fibers that contribute directly
to the motor output, providing a low-level, detailed output
measure (Ahrens et al., 2012; Gruner and Altman, 1980; Tu and
Dickinson, 1996). This level of description has its roots in the
study of motor reflexes and has provided fundamental insights
into neural circuit organization but presents technical and
analytical challenges when applied to a complex behavioral
repertoire.Neuron 78, May 22, 2013 ª2013 Elsevier Inc. 587
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Figure 2. Different Levels of Behavioral
Metrics
(A) Tactic behaviors cause animals tomigrate up or
down gradients of some environmental cue. Here
we examine the case of tracking C. elegans to
measure a tactic behavior. The top triangle rep-
resents a gradient in stimulusmagnitude, and each
dot in the field below represents an instantaneous
center of mass position of a worm in the gradient.
On this scale, dot diameters are roughly the size of
the worm.
(B) In steady state, the distribution of worm
positions over the gradient can be measured as an
index or as a full distribution. Such measurements
can also be made over time, incorporating tran-
sient changes in distribution.
(C) At a finer scale, each worm’s track can be
reconstructed in order to extract out the statistics
of the worm’s coarse movements, including
speed, heading, and, for instance, turning events.
Turns are marked in red, gray dots represent early
locations, black later locations, and the bar
represents a worm’s body length. The integration
over time of relevant statistics at this level should
result in the distribution measured in (B).
(D) More finely still, the shape of the worm’s
bending over time can be analyzed to extract
patterns in muscle activation. These patterns must
ultimately result in the statistics in (C) and the
distribution in (B).
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is measured in amanner that accurately captures all the informa-
tion it contains. However, in unrestrained animals, such data sets
can be hard to obtain and challenging to analyze, particularly
if multiple animals are interacting (Branson et al., 2009). It is
therefore often necessary to constrain the animal’s behavior to
a limited set of outcomes or to reduce the dimensionality of
behavior. This can be done either by intuitively electing to focus
on specific behavioral outputs or by applying more general data
dimensionality reduction techniques like principal component
analysis (PCA). A key question then becomes how to perform
this dimensionality reduction without losing important circuit
outputs. An ideal version of this transformation would minimize
the loss of relevant information and eliminate redundancy and
noise from the signal. While it is not necessary to preserve all in-
formation in the behavior, it is essential to preserve the part of the
behavioral signal that is related to the input stimulus. In practice,
a few metrics can be used to assess the preservation of relevant
information. For example, it is possible to quantify howpredictive
the input stimulus is of the behavioral output by computing the
correlation or mutual information between these two signals
(Lewi et al., 2011; Machens, 2002). Similarly, the extent to which
an input is correctly predicted by the output (an approach that is
limited by the quality of one’s predictive model) is another useful
metric (Bialek and Rieke, 1992; Bialek et al., 1991). Computing
these metrics allows for the assessment of the relative quality
of different behavioral or neural representations and makes it
significantly easier to compare behavioral phenotypes.
How Can One Address Feedback from Behavioral
Outputs to Sensory Inputs?
As we have discussed so far, circuits involved in sensori-
motor transformation can be studied in an entirely reactive588 Neuron 78, May 22, 2013 ª2013 Elsevier Inc.mode: a stimulus is provided, and a behavioral output is evoked.
Yet because the animal is often restrained, the behavioral output
has no impact on the animal’s subsequent sensory experience.
This framework breaks the natural feedback of an animal’s
behavioral output on its perception, preventing the statistics of
the sensory environment from being altered in the way that evo-
lution and experience has entrained in the circuit. Because the
feedback loop is broken, these experiments are called ‘‘open
loop.’’ While breaking the feedback loop has its place, being
able to understand and manipulate feedback loops is important
for understanding the circuit. Given that sensorimotor circuits
normally use such feedback, it is critical to know how uncoupling
behavior from perception might produce misleading answers.
Finally, ‘‘awake and behaving’’ brains are in a different neuromo-
dulatory state from those in a passive, restrained animal, altering
the responses of sensory circuits in ways that can be general
(corresponding to arousal) or specific (altering, for example,
the tuning properties of specific neurons). Here we outline
some of these effects and then consider ways of manipulating
feedback between sensory inputs and behavioral outputs.
An animal’s sensory strategy can be tuned according to its
motor output. As it moves, it displaces its sensory organs in
some spatiotemporal pattern, imposing this sampling pattern
on its observations of the natural world. The brain has access
to information about these movement patterns in two ways,
both statistically over time and on a trial-by-trial basis, through
proprioceptive sensors and circuits that return efferent copies
of motor commands to sensory systems. For example, recent
work has demonstrated that the gain of motion-sensitive cells
in the fly visual system is dynamically adjusted by transient bouts
of either walking or flying, boosting responses to more rapid
motion stimuli (Chiappe et al., 2010; Jung et al., 2011; Maimon
et al., 2010). Analogous results have been described in fish
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broadly consistent with longstanding observations in awake,
behaving primates (Reynolds and Chelazzi, 2004). Whether
these specific signals represent different brain states, in which
the activities of many neurons are altered, or whether these
signals reflect targeted modulations of neurons whose outputs
are of particular relevance to movement (such as neurons that
detect visual motion) remains unclear.
A variety of efforts have established ‘‘virtual reality’’ environ-
ments in which the experimentalist captures the intended move-
ments of the animal while it is immobilized or restrained and uses
this information to alter the sensory world to reflect its intended
movement (reviewed in Dombeck and Reiser, 2012). Such
‘‘closed loop’’ systems were pioneered in flies and have been
used to examine innate behavioral responses to visual (Goetz,
1968) and olfactory signals (Duistermars and Frye, 2008). Analo-
gous systems have been implemented for mice, allowing full,
three-dimensional reconstructions of virtual visual worlds
(Harvey et al., 2009). These systems allow manipulation of the
natural relationship between sensory inputs and motor output
and also facilitate simultaneous monitoring of neural activity
and behavior. In addition, while obtaining real-time feedback
from an immobilized animal provides one means of closing the
behavioral loop, it is also possible to systematically explore
open and closed loop regimes by tracking a freely moving animal
and displacing the sensory world in real time (Fry et al., 2004;
Schuster et al., 2002; Strauss and Heisenberg, 1990). Alterna-
tively, one can reopen the loop between sensory input and
behavioral output in a freely moving animal by adjusting the
sensory environment around it so as to remove the effects on
the input that would have been produced by its motor output
(Fry et al., 2008, 2009). Finally, experiments in zebrafish have
gone one step further in decoupling behavioral output from
sensory input. In these experiments, fish were paralyzed, and
motor neuron signals were monitored; from these signals,
swimmovements were decoded and used to control the sensory
input (Ahrens et al., 2012; Portugues and Engert, 2011).
What can we hope to learn from dynamically manipulating the
feedback between movement and sensation? At one extreme,
neural circuit function might be fundamentally different when
an animal is behaving versus quiescent and may depend on
the type of behavior performed (e.g., flying or walking). Fortu-
nately for much of the work that has been done in sensory neuro-
science, this extreme does not seem to closely match reality:
while the tuning properties of specific cells change in response
to behavioral activity, the core features of these responses are
apparent in the nonbehaving animal (Clark et al., 2007; Ferezou
et al., 2006; Maimon et al., 2010). However, when experiments
are conducted in open-loop conditions, in which the sensory
input is well controlled but independent of behavior, the
observed behavioral responses might be shaped not only by
the sensory input but also by the discrepancy between it and
the expected input given the behavioral modulation. A virtual
reality environment can eliminate these discrepancies but can
also accentuate them, enabling exploration of circuit function
under a broad range of conditions. These studies can reveal
what elements of behavioral feedback a circuit is sensitive to,
facilitating the description of the computation it performs. Inaddition, there are circuits that largely encode information in rela-
tion to efferent copies of the animal’s movements and compute,
for example, error signals between the sensory inputs an animal
receives and those it expects (Boyden and Raymond, 2003;
Portugues and Engert, 2011). While such circuits could be rare,
information about the ongoing behavior of the animal is probably
relayed to many levels of each sensory system, affecting many
neurons, and what differs is the granularity and extent to which
a given neuron’s response is dominated by sensory input versus
behavioral output.
What Is the Goal of Circuit Manipulation?
With informative stimuli and behavioral metrics in hand, the ulti-
mate goal when examining a circuit is to understand how the
circuit components contribute to the sensorimotor transforma-
tion. Genetic tools that manipulate circuits can provide causal
links between neural activity and behavioral output, an in-
valuable contribution to understanding circuit function. Cell
type-specific expression of proteins allows constitutive or acute
activation or inactivation of neurons by light, temperature, or
drugs in worms, flies, fish, and mice (Bernstein and Boyden,
2011; England, 2010; Fenno et al., 2011; Luo et al., 2008;
Miesenbo¨ck, 2009; Venken et al., 2011; White and Peabody,
2009). Having independent control over each synaptic input to
a cell while providing a stimulus and monitoring behavior would
allow one to attribute particular behavioral and computational
roles to specific synapses. While such tools are not broadly
available, exciting steps in this direction are underway (Iban˜ez-
Tallon and Nitabach, 2012; Levitz et al., 2013; Szobota and
Isacoff, 2010). More modestly, one can envision artificially con-
trolling the activity of a neuron, reproducing exactly its native
temporal activity and statistics in the context of a particular stim-
ulus and then deviating from it. While this is, in principle, possible
using optogenetic tools, such a systematic exploration has not
yet been done. Fortunately, cruder experiments that either
silence or ablate neurons, or increase their activities indepen-
dent of their synaptic inputs, can provide many useful insights.
Regardless of the granularity of the genetic manipulation of
neural activity, it is critical to minimize the opportunities for a
circuit to adapt or compensate, either developmentally or phys-
iologically. In particular, adaptive changes in circuit function on
the timescale of milliseconds to minutes are essentially un-
avoidable and might reflect the dynamics of sensorimotor pro-
cessing. However, circuit changes that reflect modulation of
gene expression or synaptic connectivity and morphology over
longer timescales are largely undesirable. Therefore, the most
interpretable experiments implement acute changes in neural
activity and rapidly read out circuit function.
Neurons can be either activated or inactivated by genetic
manipulation. At first glance, inactivation would appear to be
the simpler manipulation, since there are relatively few ways to
be ‘‘inactive.’’ However, existing tools for inactivation are not
equivalent to voltage clamps that chain neurons exactly to their
resting potentials. Typical tools either tonically or transiently
hyperpolarize a neuron or physically prevent synaptic release.
For spiking neurons, if one can ignore subthreshold effects on
membrane potential, and ignore electrical synapses and
extracellular effects, either of these manipulations should beNeuron 78, May 22, 2013 ª2013 Elsevier Inc. 589
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Figure 3. Circuit Manipulation
(A) Cartoon of a simple, intact circuit. The purple cell simply sums the synaptic
input from the red and blue cells.
(B) Illustration of a simply interpretable silencing outcome.When the blue cell is
silenced, the purple cell now simply reports the red cell’s activity. The entire
system is linear in this case.
(C) Illustration of dynamic range confounding interpretation. In this case, when
the blue cell is silenced, the lack of a tonic blue input moves the purple cell
below its natural dynamic range, clipping its response to the remaining input.
This is the equivalent of putting a nonlinearity g(.) on the summation of the
inputs. The linear case is shown in light purple for comparison.
(D) Illustration of feedback gain confounding interpretation. In this case, the
inputs are summed, but the purple cell provides negative feedback on the gain
from the red and blue cells. When the blue cell is silenced, the gain on the red
synapse is increased to accommodate the lesser total input. The linear case is
shown in light purple for comparison. Cases (C) and (D) illustrate complications
to interpreting silencing experiments in even very simple circuits; similar
caveats will apply to activation experiments.
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‘‘silencing’’). On the other hand, for graded potential neurons,
both of these manipulations are more problematic since there
is no natural minimum activity equivalent to 0 Hz. Nevertheless,
in both spiking and nonspiking cases, ‘‘inactivation’’ really
means setting the output to be constant and low, a condition
that is likely to be substantially different from that seen in the
intact circuit.590 Neuron 78, May 22, 2013 ª2013 Elsevier Inc.For neuronal activation, genetic tools can depolarize cells or
directly increase intracellular calcium. Again, if electrical syn-
apses can be ignored, these are functionally comparable manip-
ulations. For both spiking and nonspiking cells, one might hope
that constitutive activation entails setting a constant, high level of
synaptic output. However, given both cellular and network dy-
namics,many of thesemanipulations probably produce unstable
increases in activity. Many of these manipulations have defined
circuit elements sufficient to evoke behaviors, but it is important
to note that neurons that require precise activation protocols to
drive behavior would have been missed.
The issues surrounding single-cell manipulations lead to the
question of how one should interpret silencing or activation ex-
periments in the context of networks. How comparable is the
network activity in the artificially activated case compared to
natural activation? And conversely, during silencing, is it merely
as if the affected neuron is removed from the network? For
example, in the simplest case, neurons are perfectly linear, and
thus the effects of silencing or activation are easily interpretable
(Figures 3A and 3B). However, common regulatory mechanisms,
such as gain control or adaptation could wreak havoc with
manipulation experiments (Figures 3C and 3D). While rapid
feedback is likely to affect the outcome of many circuit perturba-
tions, adaptation seemsmore likely to arisewith longer timescale
manipulations, such as the thermal activation and inactivation
methods often used in Drosophila (Kitamoto, 2001; Rosenzweig
et al., 2005). Brief perturbations that can be applied on the same
timescale as natural network activity, such as the ones enabled
by optogenetics, should give the most insight into a neuron’s
contribution to the network. Neural circuits have necessarily
evolved to be robust to natural perturbations (such as injuries)
and flexible (to accommodate variable environments); these
redundant or distributed forms of processing may make the
effects of experimental manipulation difficult to characterize.
This suggests that although extreme manipulations (such as
eliminating more than one cell type or leaving activity intact in
only one of many cell types) may be advantageous, they also
increase the likelihood that compensatory mechanisms shape
the resulting output.
Ultimately, one should compare the perturbed network’s
activity to a model’s predictions. A strong model predicts both
the activity of the unperturbed network and the effects of per-
turbations. Furthermore, since removing a neuron’s output could
have strong and counterintuitive effects on circuit function if
feedback mechanisms are prominently involved, models that
incorporate feedback could be critical when interpreting how
discretemanipulations of circuit components influence behavior.
What Is in a Model?
Given the complexity of the brain, models of circuit function are
of paramount importance and can serve two valuable purposes.
First, a model can provide a test of sufficiency. Is a certain set
of assumptions and mechanisms sufficient to produce the ob-
served measurement of circuit activity or behavioral response?
Second, a model can generate testable experimental hypo-
theses by suggesting other phenomena produced by these
assumptions. Biological models fall into two broad classes.
One class of models is detail oriented, incorporating as much
What functions does the
circuit perform?
What algorithms does the
circuit use to perform its
function?
How does the network 
implement these algorithms?
How does cellular biophysics
generate required neural and
synaptic properties?
Circuit Utility
Algorithms
Network implementation
Neural and synaptic 
implementation
Summarize
details
Suggest constraints/
mechanisms
Figure 4. A Hierarchy of Levels of Understanding Neural
Computation
Modeling, detailed behavioral analysis, stimulus selection, neural manipula-
tions, and neural measurements feed into understanding at all these levels.
Moving up through the hierarchy, one goal is to abstract away low-level
details to derive broader descriptions. Moving down through the hierarchy,
one goal is to use the broader descriptions to suggest mechanisms or con-
straints that might be sought in the lower levels.
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possible, with the goal of achieving verisimilitude. In these ‘‘real-
istic’’ models, additional parameters that capture more of the
biology are useful. Themodel becomes amirror for the biological
system, and its value lies chiefly in its ability to explore para-
meters and predict results of novel experiments. Likewise, it
provides mechanistic explanations for observed phenomena
by permitting simulation of the dynamics of contributing compo-
nents. For example, a model of this type captures the responses
of insect photoreceptors to light, providing insight into how
these cells efficiently represent information across light levels
(Song et al., 2012). An alternative type of model is phenomeno-
logical, seeking to derive the simplest construct that produces
a particular feature of a stimulus-response relationship. Such
models can be derived from experimental data or can emerge
from first-principles considerations of a circuit’s objectives and
constraints (Bialek, 1987; Field, 1994; Hassenstein and Reich-
ardt, 1956; Hateren, 1992; Laughlin, 1981; Srinivasan et al.,
1982). In this case, the model may not provide verisimilitude
across a broad range of conditions and the specific features of
the model are not exact representations of how the brain works.
Rather, this kind ofmodel describes some set of phenomena and
provides a potential explanation for them. A popular example is
the LN model (Figure 1C), which gives intuition about the
dynamics and range of a response without referencing biological
details of how the linear and nonlinear features arise. At the same
time, phenomenological models like the LN framework have
been widely used because the individual components of the
model, like a saturating nonlinearity, are biologically plausible.
Realistic versus phenomenological models offer particular
tradeoffs. By their nature, phenomenological models have fewer
parameters and fewer equations. Thus, they are more likely to be
analytically tractable, allowing one to easily examine how re-
sponses vary as a function of different inputs. Likewise, param-
eter space, and interactions between parameters, can be easily
explored. However, parameters in phenomenological models
may be difficult to map directly onto biological processes,
making them less useful for exploring mechanistic details.
Indeed, such a model may capture a circuit algorithm, even
when it is difficult to map the biophysical implementation onto
model parameters. Moreover, a successful phenomenological
model would correctly predict responses of a circuit to novel
stimuli, suggesting informative experiments. Conversely, while
the parameters of a realistic model may provide insight into
how the biophysical and network details give rise to function, it
may give little insight into the computation that takes place. As
many circuits may implement the same high-level computations
via different molecular mechanisms (Marder and Goaillard,
2006), both the algorithmic and implementation details of circuits
are important to model. Furthermore, as models become more
complex and require numerical integration, it becomes harder
to intuitively appreciate the relationship between a model’s pre-
dictions and its parameters. There is thus a spectrum of models,
ranging from the simple and analytic to the complex and numer-
ical, often trading intuition for a more exact representation of the
system. Given the tradeoffs, the goals of a model should be
considered carefully when deciding what to incorporate into it.
Broadly speaking, the simplest model that explains the data isdesirable. However, since there is no clear definition of ‘‘simple,’’
choosing the simplest model is often a matter of taste and the
relative importance of defined biological mechanismswill be crit-
ical. Finding the fewest parameters necessary to fit the data
clearly offers advantages, but fit quality itself can also be defined
in many ways, depending on the purpose of the model.
The continuum of levels of understanding a circuit, from algo-
rithm to neural instantiation to biophysical machinery (Figure 4),
also lends itself to a continuum of modeling structures (Marr,
1982). At a high level, the aim is to map the phenomenology of
a circuit, showing how it translates input to output and how
that output serves the animal (e.g., Goetz, 1968). At a more
detailed level, the algorithms employed by the circuit to produce
the phenomena are identified and define the mathematical oper-
ations required to transform the circuit inputs into its outputs
(e.g., Hassenstein and Reichardt, 1956). As the model takes
into account greater detail, the hope is to assign algorithmic
operations to particular circuit components (e.g., Olsen and
Wilson, 2008). At a biophysical level, one could model how an
individual neuron’s channels, spatial arrangement of synapses,
morphology, cellular compartments, and excitability contribute
to its input-output functions within the circuit (e.g., Herz et al.,
2006). An important long-term goal of circuit dissection efforts
is to link models at different levels in this hierarchy. However,
as one progresses from top to bottom in this framework, redun-
dancy and distributed computations make mapping algorithms
onto specific lower-level components a daunting problem.
Conversely, as one progresses from bottom to top, the higher
levels must increasingly make use of coarse-grained versions
of the low-level details, which are displaced in favor of quantita-
tive summaries. For instance, the representation of a synapse in
a neural network model may have very different features, de-
pending on the level at which the network is described, andNeuron 78, May 22, 2013 ª2013 Elsevier Inc. 591
Neuron
Perspectivethe goal of the description. A detailed model of transmission
between two neurons might capture the dynamic, stochastic
nature of synaptic vesicle release and depletion. A higher-level
model of the interactions in a network, on the other hand, may
incorporate a concise mathematical description of the synapse
that only captures the average effects of vesicle release. In
moving from the top level downward, one broad challenge lies
in identifying required operations that can be sought in lower-
level elements of the circuit. In moving from the bottom level
upward, a second challenge lies in discovering the principled
ways to summarize the low-level details as models capture
ever-larger aspects of circuit function. Generating and linking
these levels of models is essential to truly understand and test
how circuits work.
Conclusions
The logic and language of genetics have provided innumerable
insights into gene function. Genetic tools that modulate the ac-
tivity of targeted neurons have inspired the application of logi-
cally equivalent approaches to neural circuits. These studies
add critical elements to our understanding, creating maps that
describe causal links between neurons and behaviors of interest.
However, this is not necessarily the ultimate goal of circuit
dissection. Much as biochemical, biophysical, and computa-
tional approaches provide new insights into the arrow diagrams
of geneticists, understanding the relationships between stimulus
space, behavioral responses, and the dynamics of neuronal ac-
tivity will be necessary to unravel the mechanisms of neural
computation. By exploring circuits that perform similar sensori-
motor transformations in different model systems, spanning a
broad expanse of phylogeny, these studies will reveal the con-
straints under which fundamental neural computations have
evolved. Finally, given new efforts to measure and map neural
activity and to simulate the human brain in silico (Alivisatos
et al., 2013;Markram, 2006), building the considerations outlined
here into experimental design will be critical to understanding
circuits on grand scale.
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